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Abstract—On electronic game platforms, different payment
transactions have different levels of risk. Risk is generally higher
for digital goods in e-commerce. However, it differs based on
product and its popularity, the offer type (packaged game,
virtual currency to a game or subscription service), storefront
and geography. Existing fraud policies and models make deci-
sions independently for each transaction based on transaction
attributes, payment velocities, user characteristics, and other
relevant information. However, suspicious transactions may still
evade detection and hence we propose a broad learning approach
leveraging a graph based perspective to uncover relationships
among suspicious transactions, i.e., inter-transaction dependency.
Our focus is to detect suspicious transactions by capturing
common fraudulent behaviors that would not be considered
suspicious when being considered in isolation. In this paper,
we present HITFRAUD that leverages heterogeneous information
networks for collective fraud detection by exploring correlated
and fast evolving fraudulent behaviors. First, a heterogeneous
information network is designed to link entities of interest in the
transaction database via different semantics. Then, graph based
features are efficiently discovered from the network exploiting
the concept of meta-paths, and decisions on frauds are made
collectively on test instances. Experiments on real-world payment
transaction data from ELECTRONIC ARTS demonstrate that the
prediction performance is effectively boosted by HITFRAUD with
fast convergence where the computation of meta-path based
features is largely optimized. Notably, recall can be improved
up to 7.93% and F-score 4.62% compared to baselines.
Index Terms—collective fraud detection, inter-transaction de-
pendency, heterogeneous information network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fraud detection has attracted significant research efforts in
recent years for various tasks including finance, security and
web services. In this work, we investigate the fraud detection
problem on electronic game platforms where it is desirable
to identify suspicious payment transactions in an early stage
in order to avoid chargebacks and to enhance normal users’
experience. Current fraud models make independent decisions
for each transaction, and detection becomes harder when
intelligent adversaries are used, e.g., proxy IP addresses. Graph
based methods can detect frauds by leveraging the linkage
information between entities of interest [10, 11, 13]. Such
methods are relatively harder to evade because making a fraud
This work was partially done while the author was an intern at Electronic
Arts.
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Fig. 1. A simplified example of the constructed heterogeneous information
network.
payment transaction unavoidably generates links in the graph
which reveals inter-transaction dependency.
Existing graph based fraud detection approaches heavily
focus on homogeneous information networks and bipartite
graphs. Heterogeneous information networks (HINs) [28] are
a special type of information networks that involve multiple
types of nodes or multiple types of links, as shown in Figure 1.
In a HIN, different types of nodes and links have different
semantic meanings. Such complex and semantically enriched
networks possess great potential for knowledge discovery
[2, 12, 15, 29]. Its applications to fraud detection, however, are
largely unexplored. Machine learning approaches that leverage
a variety of data sources or fuse heterogeneous information can
be referred to as broad learning.
Therefore, we are motivated to investigate how to lever-
age HINs to facilitate the fraud detection task. Most impor-
tantly, we seek to capture the inter-transaction dependency.
It is critical to explore such relationships among suspicious
transactions because fraudulent behaviors are often correlated
and fast evolving. (1) HINs provide us with an effective
and compact representation of linked transactions in various
semantics, e.g., the same currency, the same IP address, and
the same game titles. The statistics of the label information
ar
X
iv
:1
70
9.
04
12
9v
2 
 [c
s.L
G]
  1
9 S
ep
 20
17
(i.e., fraud or normal) of these linked transactions can be
aggregated, and thereby add a new dimension of measurements
to distinguish suspicious transactions from normal ones based
on the correlated fraudulent behaviors. (2) In order to tackle
the problem of fast evolving fraudulent behaviors, we should
not only consider the inter-transaction dependency across
training transactions and test transactions, but also include
the dependency among test transactions. Hence, suspicious
transactions are identified in a semi-supervised manner by
iteratively obtaining the predicted labels of test transactions
and updating the statistics of linked transactions in alternation.
Such a collective prediction procedure has the potential to
detect a suspicious transaction even if it appears to be normal
by itself but its linked transactions (other test transactions in
a batch sharing categorical variables) are identified as very
suspicious, and thereby improve the recall metric. The main
contributions of this work are fourfold:
• As fraud payment transactions generally do not occur in
isolation, i.e., fraudulent behaviors are often correlated and
fast evolving, we formulate the fraud detection task as a col-
lective prediction problem in a HIN to capture relationships
among fraud payment transactions. (Section II)
• To address the daunting challenge on huge feature space, we
design a HIN that can effectively capture the various rela-
tionships among transactions. Here meta-paths (a sequence
of link types) are explored to identify the relevant inter-
transaction dependency features. (Section III)
• We propose an effective and efficient algorithm to compute
meta-path based features in the framework of collective
fraud detection. (Section IV)
• We validate that the observation that fraudulent behaviors
are often correlated and fast evolving can indeed be explored
to more effectively capture fraud payment transactions. We
evaluate the proposed framework on real-world payment
transaction data from ELECTRONIC ARTS payment system,
and results show that recall and F-score can significantly be
improved by exploring inter-transaction dependency via the
proposed collective fraud detection method based on HINs.
(Section V)
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Heterogeneous Information Network (HIN). A heteroge-
neous information network is a type of information network
with multiple types of nodes or multiple types of links [28, 29].
It can be represented as a directed graph G = (V, E).
V = V1∪· · ·∪Vm denotes the set of nodes involving m node
types: V1 = {v11 , · · · , v1n1}, · · · ,Vm = {vm1 , · · · , vmnm} where
vip represents the p-th node of type i. E = E1∪· · ·∪Er ⊆ V×V
denotes the set of links between nodes in V involving r link
types. Mathematically, a link type k starting from source nodes
of type i and ending at target nodes of type j is described by
an adjacency matrix Ak ∈ Rni×nj where Ak[p, q] = 1 if there
exists a link in Ek between vip and vjq , otherwise Ak[p, q] = 0.
We can write this link type as “Vi E
k
−−→ Vj”.
Collective Fraud Detection. We may assume without loss
of generality that nodes in V1 are the target entities, i.e.,
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Fig. 2. The network schema of EA payment transaction data. Each rectangle
represents a node type, and each line represents a link type.
transactions, in the case of fraud detection. The number of
target entities is denoted as n = n1. Formally, we are given
a data matrix X = [xT1 ; · · · ;xTn ] where xi ∈ Rd is the
feature vector of the i-th transaction which typically involves
extensive feature engineering and domain knowledge. Labels
are denoted as y = [y1, · · · , yn] where yi = 1 if the i-th
transaction is a fraud, otherwise yi = 0. The target is to
identify the label yu of an unseen transaction xu (typically,
with different items, user accounts, billing accounts, and IP
addresses, etc.).
In this paper, we investigate how to leverage a HIN to
facilitate the fraud detection task. The problem of collective
fraud detection in a HIN reduces to learning a predictive
function f : (V, E ,X) → y. It is a nontrivial problem due
to threefold challenges:
• We need to design a network that can capture various
relationships among transactions.
• We need to discover relevant network features efficiently,
whose time complexity should ideally be linear to the
number of transactions and insensitive to the type of re-
lationships.
• We need to effectively explore dependency among suspi-
cious transactions, especially among the test ones, in order to
detect the correlated and fast evolving fraudulent behaviors.
III. DATASET
In this work, we use ELECTRONIC ARTS (EA) payment
transaction data as an example to do the study. All transactions
on EA digital platform go through a set of policies, rules and
models to determine their levels of risk, and a subset of them
are sent for additional manual review. An experienced team re-
views those transactions and decides if they should be rejected
TABLE I
TOP-10 DISCRIMINATIVE META-PATHS AND THEIR SEMANTICS.
ID Meta-path Semantics
#1 transaction
byBilling−−−−−−−→ billing billingIP−−−−−−−→ IP billingIP
−1
−−−−−−−−−→ billing byBilling
−1
−−−−−−−−−→ transaction from the same billing IP address
#2 transaction tranIP−−−−−→ IP tranIP
−1
−−−−−−−→ transaction from the same transaction IP address
#3 transaction
byBilling−−−−−−−→ billing byBilling
−1
−−−−−−−−−→ transaction using the same billing account
#4 transaction
byUser−−−−−→ user byUser
−1
−−−−−−−→ transaction using the same user account
#5 transaction tranIP−−−−−→ IP billingIP
−1
−−−−−−−−−→ billing byBilling
−1
−−−−−−−−−→ transaction transaction IP and billing IP are the same
#6 transaction
byBilling−−−−−−−→ billing billingIP−−−−−−−→ IP tranIP
−1
−−−−−−−→ transaction billing IP and transaction IP are the same
#7 transaction containsItem−−−−−−−−−−→ item containsItem
−1
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ transaction containing the same item
#8 transaction containsItem−−−−−−−−−−→ item isT itle−−−−−→ title isT itle
−1
−−−−−−−→ item containsItem
−1
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ transaction containing the same game title
#9 transaction
fromSource−−−−−−−−−→ source fromSource
−1
−−−−−−−−−−−→ transaction from the same source
#10 transaction
byUser−−−−−→ user userCountry−−−−−−−−−→ country userCountry
−1
−−−−−−−−−−−→ user byUser
−1
−−−−−−−→ transaction from the same user country
or approved, and this review decision is used as the ground-
truth for training and evaluating fraud detection algorithms.
We collected manual review data for n = 130K transactions
during a recent period. Each transaction is associated with
a d = 2K dimensional feature vector, including transaction
attributes, payment velocities, user characteristics, and other
relevant information.
A HIN is constructed by linking entities of interest from
several selected databases. Transactions are the target instances
on which fraud decisions are made, so each transaction ID
is represented as a node in the network, and the set of
transaction IDs compose a node type in the network schema.
In addition, other entities that are directly or indirectly related
to a transaction are considered here, and they compose other
node types in the schema, including billing accounts, user
accounts, game titles, IP addresses, etc. Links are added based
on common semantics. For example, a transaction is linked
with a user if the user placed the transaction, and a transaction
is linked with an item if the transaction contains the item.
As a result, the constructed HIN is composed of over
400K nodes and 1.5M links. It integrates data involving
m = 12 types of nodes, such as transaction, user, item, title,
currency, source, country, etc. which are connected through
r = 15 types of links, such as “transaction containsItem−−−−−−−−−→
item”, “billing
billingIP−−−−−−→ IP”, etc. Its network schema is
shown in Figure 2. Note that billing and country are directly
linked in two different semantics: country corresponding to
the billing address, and country associated with the Bank
Identification Number (BIN). Each billing account is designed
to be associated with one country following each semantics.
IV. METHOD
In this paper, we present a broad learning approach, named
HITFRAUD, for collective fraud detection in HINs by captur-
ing inter-transaction dependency. The proposed framework is
outlined as:
1) The aforementioned HIN is designed so that it contains
entities of interest as nodes, e.g., transactions, billing
accounts, user accounts, game titles, and IP addresses. Two
entities are linked if they appear together in a record.
2) Efficient ways of finding downsized meta-paths from trans-
action nodes are explored using breadth-first-search on the
network schema. Meta-path based features are computed
by pairing the pre-computed downsized meta-paths.
3) The predicted labels of test transactions are obtained from a
trained classifier, and meta-path based features are updated
using both the labels of training transactions and the
predicted labels of test transactions, in alternation until
convergence.
A. Capturing Inter-Transaction Dependency
First, we briefly review the concept of meta-path following
previous work [3, 15, 28]. It has been demonstrated to be use-
ful for mining P2P lending networks [30], social networks [2],
bioinformatic networks [3, 15], and bibliographic networks
[16, 28].
In general, a meta-path corresponds to a type of path
within the network schema, containing a certain sequence
of link types. For example, in Figure 2, a meta-path
“transaction containsItem−−−−−−−−−→ item isT itle−−−−→ title isT itle
−1
−−−−−−→ item
containsItem−1−−−−−−−−−−→ transaction” denotes a composite relation
between transactions where containsItem−1 represents the
inverted relation of containsItem. The semantic meaning of
this meta-path is that transactions contain items that belong
to the same game title. Different meta-paths usually repre-
sent different semantic meanings between linked nodes. In
this manner, various relationships among transactions can be
described by a set of meta-paths. By capturing such inter-
transaction dependency and aggregating the label information
of the linked transactions, we could better detect correlated
fraudulent behaviors. In other words, we could identify trans-
actions with highly risky values in a categorical variable, e.g.,
game title. Intuitively, when a recent launch of FIFA attracts
many frauds to it, transactions that contain FIFA would be
more suspicious than others. Similarly, transactions that are
related to user accounts, billing accounts, IP addresses and
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(b) A meta-path P.
Fig. 3. An example of computing a meta-path from sparse links.
currencies with high risk could also be identified. In Table I,
we show several examples of meta-paths that are used in this
work and their semantics.
The implementation of meta-paths is essentially a chain of
matrix multiplications. Let’s denote a meta-path as P =<
Ek1 , · · · , Ekl > where the source node of Ek1 is of type
s and the target node of Ekl is of type t. The semantic
meaning of this meta-path is mathematically described as
P = Ak1 × · · · × Akl ∈ Rns×nt . Since P is usually
asymmetric, the meta-paths #5 and #6 in Table I are not
identical. It is usually assumed that the strength of connection
between vsp and v
t
q on such semantics is positively correlated
with P[p, q], because P[p, q] is the (weighted) count of paths
connecting vsp and v
t
q that follow the sequence of links in P .
Hereinafter, P and P will be used interchangeably when the
meaning is clear from context.
B. Redundancy in Meta-Paths
Cardinality, which refers to the maximum number of times
a node of the source node type can be linked with nodes of
the target node type, is represented by the styling of a line
and its endpoint in Figure 2. The notation style is similar
to entity-relationship diagrams (ERDs) where a Crow’s foot
shows many-to-one relationship.
Let’s consider a meta-path “transaction
fromSource−−−−−−−−→ source
fromSource−1−−−−−−−−−−→ transaction” in Table I and denote it as P =<
Ek1 , Ek2 > where Ek1 is the set of links indicating which
source a transaction is from, and Ek2 is its inverted relation.
The adjacency matrix of Ek1 is denoted as A ∈ Rn×ns where
n = 130K is the number of transactions and ns is the number
of sources, then that of Ek2 is AT , and P = A ×AT . Note
that an inverted relation is described by the transpose of its
original adjacency matrix rather than the inverse. Because each
transaction is conducted on one of EA game stores, Ek1 here
is a many-to-one relation between transactions and sources.
That is to say, A is extremely sparse with one value per row,
and its sparsity ratio is 1− 1/ns > 98%.
The adjacency matrix A is shown in Figure 3 for 100
randomly sampled transactions, as well as the the meta-path
P = A×AT . As we can see, through the direct application
of matrix chain multiplication, the computation of a meta-path
almost turns a sparse adjacency matrix A into a full matrix
P. Moreover, there are a lot of redundancy in P. For this
particular meta-path, if i-th transaction and the j-th transaction
are from the same source k, i.e., A[i, k] = A[j, k] = 1,
they have exactly the same row and column in P, i.e.,
P[i, :] = P[j, :] = P[:, i] = P[:, j].
C. Efficient Computation
Multiplying adjacency matrices of a meta-path in the natural
sequence can be inefficient from the time perspective, consid-
ering the classic matrix chain multiplication problem. It can
be optimized using dynamic programming in O(l3) where l
is the length of a meta-path which is usually very small. In
practice, however, the real difficulty in computing meta-paths
lies in the space constraint. As we discussed above, turning
sparse matrices into a full matrix is definitely not desirable
because it makes the space cost from linear to quadratic with
respect to the number of transactions.
Fortunately, we are not interested in the concrete form of
a meta-path itself. For the purpose of obtaining features for
fraud detection on transactions, the meta-paths that we need
to compute should have the same source node type and target
node type which is a transaction. Because each transaction
may be linked with different number of transactions through
a meta-path, aggregation functions are employed to combine
the label information of linked transactions in order to derive
a fixed number of meta-path based features. For example, we
can use the weighted label fraction of linked transactions as the
feature z ∈ Rn for each meta-path [15, 16]. It is formulated
as follows:
z = D×P× y (1)
where D ∈ Rn×n is a diagonal matrix and D[i, i] =
1/
∑
j P[i, j]. In this manner, zi indicates the ratio of being
frauds among transactions that are connected with the i-
transaction through the meta-path.
1) Many-to-One Cases: Next, we will introduce how to
obtain the feature z without explicitly computing the meta-path
P. Since the concept of meta-path is defined as a sequence
of link types, it can also be considered as a sequence of node
types that are endpoints of these links (different link sequences
can correspond to the same node sequence though), say,
P =< Vk0 , · · · ,Vkl >. We have k0 = kl = 1 since we only
consider meta-paths whose source node type and target node
type are transaction. It is assumed that transaction is always the
node set of the largest size, i.e., argmaxi{|Vi||Vi ∈ P} = 1,
and t denotes the node set of the smallest size in P , i.e.,
argmini{|Vi||Vi ∈ P} = t. Therefore, we can decompose a
meta-path P into two parts at the node type t, and its matrix
form can be written as P = P1×PT2 where P1,P2 ∈ Rn×nt .
DEFINITION 1 (Simple Meta-path): A meta-path is a simple
meta-path if it is a sequence of many-to-one relations.
Note that a simple meta-path itself is a (composite) many-
to-one relation. For example, “transaction
byBilling−−−−−−→ billing
isAccount−−−−−−→ account isType−−−−→ type” is a simple meta-path. All
meta-paths in Table I are a concatenation of a simple meta-
path and another meta-path except for the seventh and the
eighth ones which will be discussed later. Their features can
efficiently be computed.
LEMMA 1: Given a meta-path P = P1 ×PT2 where P1 is
a simple meta-path, the computation of Eq. (1) on P can be
reduced to:
z = P1 × (D2 ×PT2 × y) (2)
where D2 ∈ Rnt×nt is a diagonal matrix and D2[i, i] =
1/
∑
j P2[j, i].
PROOF 1: Because P1 is a simple meta-path, i.e., a many-to-
one relation, there is only one value per row, i.e., P1[i, ki] = 1
and P1[i, j] = 0, ∀j 6= ki.
1/D[i, i] =
∑
j
P[i, j]
=
∑
j
∑
k
P1[i, k]P
T
2 [k, j]
=
∑
j
∑
k
P1[i, k]P2[j, k]
=
∑
j
P2[j, ki]
= 1/D2[ki, ki] (3)
Assume T = D−1 ×P1 ×D2.
T[i, j] = 1/D[i, i]×P1[i, j]×D2[j, j]
=
{
1, if j = ki
0, otherwise (4)
Hence, T = P1, D × P1 = P1 × D2, and thus Eq. (1) is
equivalent to Eq. (2).
Eq. (2) is important because it enables us to obtain the
weighted label fraction of linked nodes without extensive
matrix operations. In this manner, we can effectively avoid
computing the redundant full matrix of a meta-path as an
intermediate result.
2) Many-to-Many Cases: Let’s consider the meta-path
“transaction containsItem−−−−−−−−−→ item isT itle−−−−→ title isT itle
−1
−−−−−−→ item
containsItem−1−−−−−−−−−−→ transaction” in Table I. It involves a many-
to-many link type, i.e., “transaction containsItem−−−−−−−−−→ item”, in
Figure 2.
DEFINITION 2 (Complex Meta-path): A meta-path is a
complex meta-path if it contains at least one many-to-many
relation.
Note that a complex meta-path is “usually” a (composite)
many-to-many relation. Now, we dichotomize all meta-paths
into simple meta-paths and complex meta-paths. Given any
nontrivial meta-path (l > 1), we still decompose it into two
parts at the node type of the smallest size, P = P1×PT2 , and
we propose to compute its features as follows:
z = D1 ×P1 × (D2 ×PT2 × y) (5)
where D1 ∈ Rn×n is a diagonal matrix and D1[i, i] =
1/
∑
j P1[i, j]. Obviously, D1 = In where In is an identity
matrix when P1 is a simple meta-path. Therefore, Eq. (2) is
a special case of Eq. (5) in the many-to-one scenarios.
However, Eq. (5) is not equivalent to Eq. (1) or
Eq. (2) when P1 is a complex meta-path. For example,
P =“transaction containsItem−−−−−−−−−→ item isT itle−−−−→ title isT itle
−1
−−−−−−→
item containsItem
−1
−−−−−−−−−−→ transaction” can be decomposed as
P1 = P2 =“transaction containsItem−−−−−−−−−→ item isT itle−−−−→ title”
where P1 is a complex meta-path. In Eq. (1), we compute the
average fraction of frauds in the linked transactions and each
transaction is weighted by the number of common game titles
in the current transaction. It does not, however, distinguish
which game titles are shared. In other words, each shared game
title is counted equally. In contrast, Eq. (5) counts a shared rare
title more than a shared popular title because D2 accounts for a
normalization step at the title level. The similarity between two
transactions increases proportionally to the number of titles
they share, but is offset by the popularity of the title.
Here, we present an analogy to term frequency-inverse doc-
ument frequency (tf-idf) in information retrieval. Essentially,
Eq. (1) computes the similarity between linked transactions
in a term frequency manner, while Eq. (5) captures the tf-
idf information. Most importantly, Eq. (1) is intractable when
P ∈ Rn×n is too large and nearly full, while Eq. (5) only
needs to deal with sparse matrices P1,P2 ∈ Rn×nt where nt
is typically much smaller than n.
D. Collective Fraud Detection
So far we have explored the inter-transaction dependency
to capture the correlated fraudulent behaviors where the cor-
relations mainly exist between training transactions and test
transactions. We further notice that fraudulent behaviors are
fast evolving. For example, a batch of new transactions may
be made by the same new billing account but with different
IP addresses, some of which are rather risky and others might
be proxy. It is desirable to mark all these transactions as
suspicious.
As stated in Section II, the inference problem for collective
fraud detection in a HIN is to learn a predictive function
f : (V, E ,X) → y. Conventional classification approaches
usually make an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
assumption, and thus the probability of each transaction being
frauds is inferred independently as f(xi) ∝ Pr(yi = 1|xi).
In addition to the given features X, we include features{
z1, · · · , zc} that are derived from meta-paths {P1, · · · ,Pc}
where c is the number of extracted meta-paths. Therefore, the
target is to learn
f(xi) ∝ Pr(yi = 1|xi, z1i , · · · , zci ) (6)
In this manner, however, the inference of different transac-
tions is essentially not independent, because meta-path based
features contain the label information of linked transactions
in both training and test sets. It can be done in an iterative
framework where the label of a transaction is inferred based
on the labels of its linked transactions through its meta-path
based features, and its predicted label will further be used to
Pre-compute downsized meta-
paths from transaction nodes
Trained model
A heterogeneous 
information network
Labels of training 
transactions
Compute meta-path 
based features
Predicted labels of 
test transactions
Classify whether a test 
transaction is suspicious
Train a classifier
Training transactions Test transactions
Fig. 4. The flowchart of HITFRAUD.
infer the labels of its linked transactions by updating their
meta-path based features. It is similar to the framework of
Heterogeneous Collective Classification (HCC) [16], and we
improve it with a much more efficient way of computing meta-
path based features.
DEFINITION 3 (Downsized Meta-path): Given the node
sequence of a meta-path P =< Vk0 , · · · ,Vkl >, it is a
downsized meta-path if nk0 > · · · > nkl .
We design the process of meta-path exploration based on
discussions in the last section which can be summarized into
two facts: (1) Meta-paths that are used for feature computation
in our task always start from and end at transaction nodes. (2)
Each meta-path can be decomposed into two parts at the node
type of the smallest size. Therefore, we can perform a breadth-
first-search from transaction nodes to find all downsized meta-
paths from V1 to each other node type. In the search procedure,
say, the current meta-path P is from V1 to Vi, we enumerate
link types “Vi E
k
−−→ Vj” in the network schema. If |Vi| > |Vj |,
a new meta-path P′ = P×Ak is added into Sj . Search will be
expanded from the newly added meta-paths until all downsized
meta-paths from V1 to Vi have been found and included in
Si.
In contrast to the original HCC framework where all meta-
paths connecting the target entities are pre-computed in the
initialization step which results in a lot of redundancy as
discussed in Section IV-B, we only pre-compute downsized
meta-paths and then organically combine them using Eq. (5)
in the feature computation step. In this manner, we have two
bonus effects: (1) Redundant meta-paths are automatically
avoided because a concatenation of two downsized meta-paths
is for sure not a sub-sequence of another one. (2) There is no
Algorithm 1 HITFRAUD
Input: G: a HIN, X: a feature matrix,
y[train]: labels of training instances,
A: a base classifier
Output: y[test]: labels of test instances
1: /* pre-compute downsized meta-paths */
2: p=q=0, paths[0]=In, traces[0]=[1]
3: repeat
4: for Ek=<Vi,Vj>∈ E do
5: if traces[p][end]=i and |Vi|>|Vj| then
6: paths[++q]=paths[p]×Ak
7: traces[q]=[traces[p],j]
8: end if
9: end for
10: p++
11: until p>q
12: /* collective prediction */
13: f=A(X[train,:],y[train])
14: y[test]=f(X[test,:])
15: repeat
16: c=0
17: for P1=paths[i]∈paths do
18: for P2=paths[j]∈paths do
19: if traces[i][end]=traces[j][end]
then
20: compute meta-path features z++c
by Eq. (5)
21: end if
22: end for
23: end for
24: X′=[X,z1,· · ·,zc]
25: f=A(X′[train,:],y[train])
26: y[test]=f(X′[test,:])
27: until convergence
more need to manually tune the maximal length of meta-paths.
The flowchart of the proposed method HITFRAUD is out-
lined in Figure 4 where the predicted labels of test trans-
actions are initialized from a classifier that is trained using
the given features X only. Then a new classifier is trained
using additional meta-path based features which are iteratively
updated based on both the labels of training transactions and
the predicted labels of test transactions. The pseudo-code is
presented in Algorithm 1.
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experimental Setup
As introduced in Section III, experiments are conducted on
EA payment transaction data that contains n = 130K trans-
actions with manual review labels. For training and evaluation
purposes, we segment the data into two consecutive parts so
that one-week data is used for testing models and the preceding
weeks are used for training. Based on sliding windows, 7 data
segmentations are created, each of which is denoted as W1 to
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Fig. 5. Prediction performance.
W7. Four metrics are reported: recall, precision, F-score and
accuracy.
B. Effectiveness with Various Classifiers
One claim of this paper is that HITFRAUD can work well
in conjunction with a variety of base classifiers. To evaluate
this claim, we conduct experiments using various base classi-
fiers, including random forest (RF), support vector machines
(SVM), logistic regression (LR), and factorization machines
(FM). The implementations of these base classifiers from
scikit-learn1 and fastFM2 are used with default hy-
perparameter configurations. The baselines are the same base
classifiers that explore only the given feature space X. Figure 5
shows the prediction performance comparing HITFRAUD to
the baselines. We can observe that, by conducting collective
fraud detection, HITFRAUD is usually able to outperform the
baselines with multiple choices of base classifiers, on multiple
datasets, in multiple evaluation metrics. For example, with
random forest on the W1 dataset, recall is boosted 7.93%
from 0.6737 to 0.7271 (p = 0.000), precision 0.28% from
0.9517 to 0.9543 (p = 0.218), F-score 4.62% from 0.7889
to 0.8253 (p = 0.000), and accuracy 1.17% from 0.9257
to 0.9366 (p = 0.003). Recall, F-score and accuracy are all
1http://scikit-learn.org
2https://github.com/ibayer/fastFM
significant, although precision is non-significant. In few cases,
precision is sacrificed to boost recall and the overall F-score.
However, precision and recall can be improved at the same
time by HITFRAUD in most cases. In general, it demonstrates
that HITFRAUD is flexible and effective in conjunction with
a diversity of underlying classification algorithms, and the
inter-transaction dependency can indeed be explored to more
effectively capture fraud payment transactions.
Moreover, note that c = 38 meta-paths linking transactions
are obtained after pairwise combination at the target node of
17 downsized meta-paths that are extracted from the network
schema in Figure 2. It is impressive to see such an improve-
ment from these c = 38 meta-path based features compared
to the baselines that use the given features of d = 2K
dimensions. A side observation is that random forest typically
achieves the best precision while factorization machines can
usually obtain the best recall. For practical uses, an ensemble
model is desirable on the top of HITFRAUD for the best
performance of fraud detection.
C. Fast Convergence
The number of iterations for collective prediction is set
to 10 in the results reported above. Another claim of this
paper is that HITFRAUD can actually converge fast. In order
to verify this claim, Figure 6 shows the detailed changes
of evaluation metrics on the predictions of test transactions
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Fig. 6. Convergence analysis of HITFRAUD with random forest as the base classifier.
during the iterative process. Due to space limit, we present
the convergence analysis of random forest only, and similar
observations can be found on other base classifiers. Note that
the predicted labels of test transactions are initialized from
the baseline in Algorithm 1, therefore we denote the baseline
performance as the value at iteration 0. Since the absolute
prediction performances are different across datasets, here we
plot the relative improvement of HITFRAUD over the baseline
which has the following mathematical form
RelaImpr =
(
metric(HITFRAUD)
metric(baseline)
− 1
)
× 100% (7)
It can be observed that recall, F-score and accuracy are
significantly improved in the first few iterations, and they
become stable in the late stages. In terms of precision, it
is slightly degraded in some datasets. However, we consider
this as a valuable trade-off, because we use no more than
1% decrease in precision to exchange for nearly 8% increase
in recall, and thereby always improve F-score and accuracy.
More importantly, recall is more critical in practice when the
predicted labels are used as assistance for manual review of
suspicious transactions.
D. Efficiency in Meta-Path Computation
As we discussed in Section IV-B, there is much redundancy
in the plain-vanilla computation of meta-path based features
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Fig. 7. Computation cost of meta-paths.
which aggravates not only the time cost but also the memory
consumption. There are in total c = 38 meta-paths explored in
this work, and Figure 7 compares the time cost of computing
each meta-path based feature between the approach proposed
in Section IV-C for HITFRAUD and HCC presented in [16].
The comparison of memory cost is omitted due to space limit,
and the trend is similar to Figure 7. Note that this experiment
is conducted on a network constructed from one-week data,
because the time and space cost for HCC is formidable on
the whole dataset. We can observe that the discrepancy of
time cost is significant even on the log scale. For a few cases
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF RELATED WORK ON GRAPH BASED FRAUD/ANOMALY/OUTLIER/SPAM DETECTION.
Method Input Output
HITFRAUD a heterogeneous graph (EA payment transaction graph) nodes (transactions)
ABCOutliers [8] a heterogeneous graph (Wikipedia entity graph) subgraphs (entity groups)
StreamSpot [19] multiple heterogeneous graphs (information flow graphs) graphs (system logs)
CloseMine [17] multiple heterogeneous graphs (software behavior graphs) graphs (program runs)
FRAUDAR [11] a bipartite graph (social graph) nodes (users)
fBox [27] a bipartite graph (social, rating graph) nodes (users)
CopyCatch [1] a bipartite graph (Page Likes graph) nodes (users)
FocusCO [25] a homogeneous graph (DBLP, co-purchase, citation graph) nodes (authors/movies/bloggers)
CatchSync [13] a homogeneous graph (social graph) nodes (users)
SybilRank [4] a homogeneous graph (social graph) nodes (users)
Collusionrank [7] a homogeneous graph (social graph) nodes (users)
CODA [6] a homogeneous graph (DBLP graph) nodes (conferences/authors)
TrustRank [10] a homogeneous graph (web graph) nodes (pages)
AMEN [24] a homogeneous graph (DBLP, social graph) subgraphs (author/user groups)
SODA [9] a homogeneous graph (DBLP, yeast graph) subgraphs (author/protein groups)
where HITFRAUD and HCC take almost the same time, those
are meta-paths that involve nearly one-to-one relation where
redundancy is not very severe, e.g., “transaction
byUser−−−−→ user
byUser−1−−−−−−→ transaction”. Obviously, it is not very likely that
many users would place multiple transactions within one week.
E. Case Study
We investigate the statistical significance of each meta-
path based feature in identifying suspicious transactions. On
the W1 dataset, we first obtain the meta-path based feature
values after convergence using random forest as the base
classifier, and then randomly sample 1,000 transactions from
the test set. Welch’s t-test is performed on the fraud group
and the normal group for each meta-path. It is found that
each feature associated with the meta-paths in Table I can
effectively distinguish suspicious transactions from normal
ones with significance level α = 0.05. From the results, we can
see that the correlated and fast evolving fraudulent behaviors
from the shared billing accounts, shared IP addresses, shared
user accounts, and shared game titles all play very significant
roles in determining the fraud likelihood of a test transaction.
VI. RELATED WORK
This work is related to both fraud detection and collective
classification techniques. We briefly discuss both of them.
Conventional fraud detection methods focus on detecting de-
ceptive opinion spams through review texts which, however,
can be evaded by intelligent adversaries such as carefully
selecting words in a review [14, 23]. Graph based methods
detect frauds by leveraging the linkage information between
entities of interest which are relatively harder to evade because
making a fraud transaction unavoidably generates links in the
graph [5, 11, 22]. However, the related work on graph based
fraud detection summarized in Table II are mostly based on
either homogeneous information networks or bipartite graphs,
and those for heterogeneous information networks aim to find
frauds at the level of graphs or subgraphs. In contrast, we
study the fraud detection problem at a fine-grained level of
nodes (transactions) in a complex and semantically enriched
heterogeneous information network.
Collective classification is to predict the labels for a group
of related instances simultaneously, rather than predicting a
label for each instance independently. In relational datasets,
the label of one instance can be related to the labels of
other related instances. A local classifier is usually employed
to iteratively classify unlabeled instances using both features
of the instances and relational features derived from related
instances [26]. It involves an iterative process to update the
labels and the relational features of related instances. Many
classifiers have been used, including logistic regression [18],
naı¨ve Bayes [20], relational dependency network [21], etc. The
concept of meta-paths has been applied on mining P2P lending
networks [30], social networks [2], bioinformatic networks
[3, 15], and bibliographic networks [16, 28]. However, these
approaches are not scalable because the concrete form of a
meta-path is needed.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose HITFRAUD, a collective fraud
detection algorithm that captures the inter-transaction de-
pendency. Meta-path based features are efficiently computed
through the use of pre-computing downsized meta-paths. Sus-
picious transactions in the test set are collectively identified
when they share common fraudulent behaviors. Experiments
on EA payment transaction data demonstrate that the predic-
tion performance is effectively boosted by HITFRAUD with
different choices of base classifiers and with fast convergence.
It is validated that the correlated and fast evolving fraudulent
behaviors can indeed be explored to more effectively capture
fraud payment transactions.
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